Polaris  

I’ve contributed a chapter to a recently-released volume on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal edited by P.R. Chari. If you live in India, it can be yours for only Rs. 695 (for everyone else, it will set you back a whopping 95 USD).

The book was launched last week at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi with a discussion featuring, among others, former ambassador Arundhati Ghose (of “never sign [the CTBT], not now, nor later” fame). My contribution focuses on the U.S. side, about which there has been surprisingly little in the way of reliable narrative. One of the few decent efforts is a chapter in Glenn Kessler’s The Confidante, although it focuses primarily on Condi Rice’s role (and—not surprisingly—greatly inflates it). It is my understanding that a handful of other histories are in the works. 

I’ve put up a summary of the chapter on my web site. But since there’s material that is either completely new, or little-known, I thought I’d share some of the highlights with readers of Polaris:

• The first proposal to provide an exception for India in the global nuclear order after the Pokhran-II tests came from—drumroll, please—France. Mais oui! That little detail is buried on page 143 of this engaging memoir. 
• A handful of American officials began to seriously champion the cause of nuclear engagement with India in late 2001, but the Vajpayee government—especially NSA Brajesh Mishra—was equally relentless in pursuing an agreement. Just see this 2003 speech by Mishra. 
• The first public official American acknowledgment of India’s desire for civil nuclear commerce dates from October 2003, when Secretary of State Colin Powell makes mention of it. 
• The final effort to forge a deal was kickstarted in November 2004 with Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s visit to the United States, followed shortly after by Condi Rice’s elevation to Secretary of State. Rice considered the feasibility of amending U.S. law for a nuclear agreement with India on her first week on the job. 
• At U.S. interagency meetings on the subject in May-June 2005, some non-proliferationists actually pushed for a “grand bargain” with India, believing it would be impossible to pull off. How wrong they were.
• Regardless of the rationale behind them, India’s votes against Iran at the IAEA were hugely significant in countering opposition to the deal in Washington. 
• Some self-professed friends of India—Tom Friedman, Jimmy Carter, Mira Kamdar—were not in favour of the deal. Nor were most of the American print media.
• It took the intervention of the State Department to remove six last minute insertions to the Hyde Act which would have been “deal-breakers.” 
• The influence of the Indian-American community is often credited for the passage of the Hyde Act, but the voting patterns don’t match that trend. By contrast, the role of Indian and American business groups is often underestimated.
• The 123 Agreement reversed many of the apparent limitations of the Hyde Act, without directly violating U.S. law, through the establishment a special reprocessing facility under safeguards and promised U.S. assistance in developing a fuel supply bank for India.
• In late July 2008, Bush, Rice, Stephen Hadley and other senior officials held a meeting in which they agreed to “pull out all the stops” to get the deal through, calculating also that two plenary sessions of the NSG would probably be necessary.

As mentioned earlier, you can read a summary of the entire chapter here. Or better yet, buy the book!