Polaris  

Permanent UN Security Council membership for India is not just unlikely, it’s undesirable. Why then do we care so much about it?

I must admit to being surprised by Vir Sanghvi’s recent column for The Hindustan Times, not because of how taken in he appears to have been with former U.S. president George W. Bush, but rather how convinced he was about the importance and likelihood of India’s attainment of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The reaction of Mr. Sanghvi, who is among the keener observers of the Indian political scene, suggests that misperceptions regarding the position of the United Nations in India’s foreign policy are widespread. But perhaps I should not have been surprised. India’s bid for permanent UNSC membership is a regular topic of discussion both on a number of e-mail groups to which I subscribe and, occasionally, at the odd India-related conference I attend. A series of assumptions are usually implicit:

• A UNSC permanent seat remains the ultimate symbol and privilege of a global power.
• India’s membership is not just desirable and overdue, attaining it is in fact a major objective of India’s foreign policy.
• India’s claim, nay, right to a seat derives not just from its size, growing economic power, latent military prowess and its position as a leader of the developing world, but also from its respect of and responsible past behaviour in international organizations.
• There remains a distinct possibility of India attaining a permanent seat in the short- or medium-term future.
• The United States’ lack of support to India in this matter is therefore a major irritant to the bilateral relationship. 

Each is, at the very least, questionable. Let’s start with the UNSC itself. Here you have a flagrantly unequal international body whose system for allocating members—both permanent and elected—is more than a little dubious. Since five countries currently hold veto power over decisions, the entity is often incapable of making crucial decisions in a timely manner without accommodating those states’ interests. That none of the five will be willing to relinquish their roles augurs badly for any possible reform process. Worse, as the back-and-forth on Iran’s nuclear program has revealed, the UNSC is basically impotent, lacking the ability to enforce any decision it does come to. Why India or any other self-respecting power with an eye on the future should want to sign up  to this group is beyond me. Such organizations are destined to death by irrelevance (see League of Nations).

But what of the symbolism? At present, permanent membership is held by one former colonial power whose foreign policy is closely aligned with another permanent member’s, and that is—along with yet another member—ceding some of its powers to a supranational entity. Additionally, you have a former superpower with a rapidly declining population and less influence outside its borders than at any time in its recent history. The current line-up is therefore hardly a reflection of the distribution of world power. If not for prestige or influence, there is little to suggest that India should exert any real effort in acquiring permanent UNSC membership. 

Fortunately, India’s efforts so far have been either half-hearted or ham-handed. For example, if it had been really serious about attaining a seat, why, then, did India recently field a candidate for the position of Secretary-General, something P-5 countries never do? A successful campaign would have put India in the august company of—let’s see—Sweden, Norway, Austria, Burma, Peru, Egypt, Ghana and South Korea. 

Nor has India done a particularly good job making its case to other members, despite the lip service paid to the UN at home, particularly by the left-leaning intelligentsia. Not only has it fared poorly in attempts to get elected to the UNSC, but its constant naysaying has earned it a reputation (perhaps not entirely justified) for obstruction. One irate former European Union official recently complained in my presence that few countries had shown greater disdain for the United Nations over the years than India. That may be an exaggeration, but it is indicative of how India is generally perceived in multilateral circles. India’s voting record at the UN is no help either. Since, by some estimates, India votes against the United States more than Cuba, what makes us think that the United States should be supporting our case?

Finally, we come to the question of feasibility. Either UNSC reform involves expansion—which diminishes the value of each seat and the efficacy of the institution—or the demotion of current permanent members. It is difficult to imagine under what circumstances a current member of the P-5 would voluntarily diminish its own power, and voluntarily it must be since it would still exercise veto power over important decisions. The worst scenario, arguably, is a compromise, wherein India’s permanent seat comes minus veto power. 

I’m not normally one for hypotheticals, but let us imagine for a moment that India were to be granted a seat in the coming year. Every vote of even marginal significance would be dissected by parliament (remember: the government almost fell because of a vote cast at the IAEA!). Furthermore, India would be forced to take stands on sensitive issues where, until now, its silence has been its biggest strength. Have these scenarios been seriously thought through by those unquestioningly supporting India’s case at the UN? Given the likelihood of such sticky situations, is a permanent UNSC seat really all that desirable? With apologies to Groucho Marx, India shouldn’t want to belong to any club that doesn’t accept countries like it as a member.